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1. The Nature and Relevance of Economic Efficiency 
A. market is said to be "efficient" (in economic terms) when there is no 
other feasible means of production, no other combinations of qualities and 
quantities of outputs, and no other distribution of outputs which would make 
actual and potential producers and consumers as a group better off. If for 
some reason a market is not efficient. then by definition there exists some 
change which could improve the economic "welfare" of the market's partici-
pants: that is. there are potential modifications in production and/or distri-
bution which could increase the utility (or "enjoyment") of at least one 
consl1Iller (and/or producer) without decreasing the utility of anyone else. 
More specifically, economic efficienc'y in airline service means that, 
given production and cost relationships, the quality and quantity of service 
output is one which satisfies consumers (and furthermore compensates pro-
ducers) as well as any other. If the airline market is not efficient, then on 
balance someone could gain from a change. For example, airline customers 
as a group might prefer less quality and a COInInensurate lower fare (the lower 
quality requiring less cost and thus profits -- or return to carrier investment 
remaining unchanged). Or, carriers might be able to improve the existing 
production process, thus raising profits, increasing service quality. and/or 
lowering fares. 
Of course, economic efficiency may not be the only rational public policy 
objective of an industry such as the airlines. In particular, for over 30 years 
it has been public policy to consider other goals in commercial aviation. 
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including: (al "the promotion, enconragement, and development of civil 
aeronautics," (b) "the promotion of safety in air commerce," and (c) meeting 
"the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the 
United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense, "I While 
generally these and othe r goals mentioned in the Civil 'I.e ronautics Board's 
"Declaration of Policy" are at least compatible with economic efficiency, 
depending on one's interpretation, in extreme form they can become over-
riding, For example, an efficient service is a reasonably safe one, but to 
" , , , assure the highest degree of safety ... " (emphasis mine) would mean 
no service at all. Moreover, an efficient airline market is one which "promotes 
and encourages" air se rvice to the extent consistent with optimizing resource 
use, but promotion beyond that means a less efficient market. Finally, to 
tailor air service to the special dictates of the Postal Service (PS) and/or the 
Department of Defense (DOD) probably would mean significant efficiency losses. 
However, provided PS and DOD "demands" for air service are weighed like 
those of other users, economic efficiency may obtain. 2 
There are many other public policy goals for the airline industry that 
could be mentioned. For example, the stability of rates and service, As we 
l. Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 
2. Other goals implied by Section 102 of the FA Act likewise, depending on 
interpretation, are at least consistent with economic efficiency. Examples 
include: (a) recognition and preservation of inherent advantages of air 
transport, (b) coordination of se rvices, (c) competition, (d) sound economic 
conditions, (e) adequate, economical and efficient service, (f) reasonable 
charges, (g) absence of price discrimination, and (h) limitations on pre-
dato ry competition. 
~13 
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shall see below. for the 1llarket 1llechanis1ll to function properly. prices 
(and service) will change fro1ll one ti1lle period to the next; thus. to S01lle 
extent, "stability" 1llay conflict with econ01llic efficiency. Another role the 
industry conceivably 1llay take is furthering the econ01llic develop1llent of 
sparsely populated regions of the country. While undoubtedly this was a 
successful role for the railroads in developing the West. there is little hard 
e vidence that C01ll1lle rcial ai r se rvice has a significant impact on com1llunity 
develop1llent, and, even if it did, one could speculate that develop1llent in one 
area is at the sacrifice of another, It would appear therefore that an undue 
e1llphasis on an econ01llic develop1llent role for the airlines can conflict with 
econ01llic efficiency. 
Finally. another, very important public policy goal is "equity." For 
exarrtple. the institution of charging children less than adults is so ingrained 
that to suggest s01llething different ruffles 1ll0st people's sensitivities. Yet, 
fro1ll an econ01llic efficiency standpoint (vis-a.-vis profit or revenue maxi-
1llizing price discri1llination) there is little or no "justification" for children's 
discounts except in extraordinary circu1llstances. Another example, which 
incidentally. shows changing attitudes toward equity, is airline discounts for 
"youth" and the elderly. Because of backlash to student agitation in the late 
1960' s, people gene rally have bec01lle less inclined toward pe r1llitting youth-
fare discounts, whereas discounts for the elderly are 1llore in favor. However, 
a special discount for businessmen, aged 30-40, would doubtless be strongly 
opposed. 
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In sununary, achieving economic efficiency in a market would appear 
to be a worthwhile, if not paramount, objective. There are many other 
public policy goals for the airlines, and for the most part these are at least 
consistent with econoIrlic efficiency, depending, of course, on one IS inte r-
pretation. However, in some cases economic efficiency cannot obtain if 
certain other goals are given too great a weight. In light of this, perhaps 
the most important role of an economist is to indicate something of the 
economic efficiency "costs" of pursuing non-economic objectives. 
II. Optimal P Ticing, Quantity, and Service Quality 
If we can assume that other industries are characterized by economic 
efficiency, then we may perform a "partial analysis" on a single industry 
such as the airlines. If this assumption does not hold, then on" may have 
to resort to that analytical framework called the "economics of the second 
best. ,,1 For the purposes of this presentation we shall assume that economic 
efficiency does obtain elsewhere and further that there are no real (as opposed 
to pecuniary) externalities. In such a setting the prices paid for resources 
attracted into the industry in question reflect the true opportunity costs of their 
use elsewhere. For example, the price paid by the airlines for an aircraft 
reflects the value of those resources used in making the aircraft (labor. 
working capital, metal, etc.) had they been utilized in producing something 
1. Cf., R. G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, "The General Theory of the 
Second Best," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 24, No.1 0956-1957). 
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else (e. g., automobiles). By assuming that there are no externalities, we 
rule out changes in air service having any positive or negative impact on the 
rest of the economy not transmitted through the price mechanism. For 
example, increased air travel may lessen auto travel and thus (for a time 
at least) lower the value of General Motors stock, reduce the rate of advance 
in United Auto Workers' incomes, and decrease the pay received by executives 
with special expertise in auto production and sales. This. however. is a 
pecuniary externality. and has no effect on optimal resource allocation. On 
the other hand, increased air travel may augment air pollution over auto 
plants and raise costs of production. This is an example of a real externality, 
but for the moment we presume that these are unimportant. 
Technical Efficiency 
One requirement for economic efficiency in any industry is "technical 
efficiency," and by that we mean achieving any output at lowest cost. 1 Given 
a production function of the form 
( I ) x = f(a,b,c .... ). 
there is a least-cost combination of inputs a, b, c, etc. which for any level 
(and quality) of output X', yields the lowest total cost to the firm. This 
technically efficient combination, of course, depends on the nature of the 
1. This distinction between technical efficiency and "allocati ve efficiency" 
is somewhat arbitrary since the well-known efficiency conditions for 
production are closely akin to the allocative efficiency conditions in 
consumption. Nevertheless, it is a useful distinction and we will adopt 
it in this presentation. 
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production funclion and the prices paid for the inputs. I In a m.anner of 
speaking, then, given resource input costs and given equation (I), there 
is a (total) cost function which gives the lowest feasible cost for any level 
of output: 
(Z) C = g(X). 
This question of technical efficiency and the lowest-cost function m.ay 
be visualized by referring to Figure 1. The average cost (i.e., cost per 
unit) curve labelled AC* is the technically efficient one, since all othe rs 
(e. g., AC' and AC") have a higher average (and total) cost for each rate of 
output (in this case taken to be available seat m.iles per year). 
Of course, an airline produces m.any "outputs" (service between different 
city pairs, different "classes" of service, etc.). so really it is m.ore accurate 
to speak of a production function of m.any outputs as well as m.any inputs. In 
im.plicit form. this can be written as 
(3) h(X I , XZ' "', X n , a, b, c, ... ) = 0, 
where Xl' X2, etc., are the various outputs. The technically efficient cost 
equation then becom.es, 
(4 ) 
This, of course, m.eans that fo r any com.bination of outputs, X I' X2, etc., 
there is a least-cost m.eans of production. 
1. The necessary condition is that the ratio of m.arginal productivity to input 
price be the same for all inputs. Cf., James M. Henderson and Richard E. 
Quandt, Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical Approach (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1958), Chapter 3. 
Average 
Cost 
o 
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Allocati ve Efficiency 
So far we have talked about what may be termed the "supply side. " 
Equally important is the "demand side." That is, presumi,;,g that all outputs 
will be produced at lowest total cost, what are the appropriate amounts of 
each output and what is their optimal distribution? This is the basic purview 
of what economists term "allocative efficiency. " 
It should be obvious that we are trying to maximize something. What 
we are trying to maximize is the collective "economic welfare" of producers 
and consumers. Producer welfare is straightforward -- profits. These are 
net revenues exceeding a normal return on investment. The economic welfare 
of consumers is a bit more difficult to define. In essence it is the excess of 
what they would be willing to pay for the service over what they actually do 
pay. Obviously consumers will increase their rate of purchase of any service 
as price is lowered. This is the so-called "law of demand." Stated another 
way, the maximum price consumers would pay for any inc remental increase 
in total output is given by the inverse of the demand relation, or, 
(5 ) p. = p. (X.) 1 1 l' 
where Pi is the demand price for output Xi. Consumers' total utility for 
consumption of any rate of Xi can be approximated by the area under relation (5). 
Subtracting total revenues paid, (net) consume r welfare is given by: 
n X· 
(6) CW = "Lrj 'pi(Xi)dXi - Pi(Xi)·X;]. 
i= 1 0 
In analogous fashion, the welfare of producers (i. e .• profit) is defined as: 
(7 ) 
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n 
PW =~Pi(Xi)'Xi - C(Xl.XZ •.••• Xn ). 
i=l 
We are now in a position to IllaxiITlize total econoITlic welfare. weighting 
the welfare of producers and conSUIllers equally. 1 Adding (6) and (7) and 
siIllplifying. Z we have: 
(8 ) 
n Xl 
TW ='L-J Pi(Xi)dXi - C(Xl.XZ ... ·.Xn )· 
i=l 0 
The first-order conditions for ITlaxiIllizing (8) are:3 
(9) 
i = 1, 2, ~ •• , n. 
This ITle rely states that reSOUrces are allocated efficiently when the price of 
each output [Pi (Xi») equals the ITlarginal cost of producing that rate of output 
We ITlay verbalize this result as follows. Marginal cost reflects the 
additional cost of production associated with increasing output by that unit. 
DeITland price is a ITleasure of the value conSUIlle rs place on the ITlarginal unit. 
Because deITland price decreases with extra units. an output less than where 
price equals ITlarginal cost ITleans that SOITle conSUIller values additional output 
more than the extra cost of production. FroIll a societal point of view. output 
in that (sub)market is thus suboptiITlal. There exists a potential for a buyer 
to cOIllpensate a producer for the extra costs incurred and still be better off. 
1. Other weights. of course. could be used. 
Z. The total revenue te rITl cancels out. 
3. We shall aSSUITle without further COIllITlent that second-order conditions 
obtain. 
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On the other hand, if the rate of any output exceeds that COlUlUensurate 
with a lUarginal price equal to lUarginal cost, then output is "superoptilUal" 
and allocative efficiency does not obtain. In such a case, conSUlUers value 
the lUarginal unit Ie s s than the as s ociated inc relUent of co s t. Alte rnati vel y, 
a reduction in output would lUean a savings in cost in excess of the lost value 
to conSUlUers. Such reasoning thus leads to the conclusion that price lUUSt 
equallUarginal cost in each lUarket for allocative efficiency to obtain. I 
In order to achieve allocative efficiency, it is essential that there be no 
arbitrary lilUitations on conSUlUer "eligibility" for particular lUarkets. That 
is, all conSUlUers lUust have access to each type of output. Arbitrarily 
lUaking one group of conSUlUers ineligible and having to enforce such a 
restraint lUeans that SOlUe conSUlUers in the group discrilUinated against 
would willingly pay more than the marginal cost of output and thus economic 
efficiency does not obtain. A similar case is whe re diffe rent consume r groups 
pay different prices for the same output. To have to enforce such a partition 
means that some in the group discriIninated against would willingly exchange 
money (i. e., a lower price) for the output consumed by the group most favored. 
If the favored group obtains output below marginal cost this still means an 
efficiency loss, for their consumption (at the margin) is valued less than the 
associated (marginal) cost of production. 
1. We note in passing that generally the production of airlil1e services is 
characterized by constant returns to scale for relevant rimges of output. 
[See "Testimony of James C. Miller III," CAB Docket 21866-7, DOT-T-I 
(August 25, 1970) and the references cited therein.] Thus "marginal cost 
pricing" would mean total revenues sufficient to cover total costs. 
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Optimal Quality 
Another allocative efficiency type question relates to the optimal quality 
of service. (Thus far we have assumed that quality is given.) For example, 
as George Douglas has shown, lower average load factors mean that flights 
are more frequent and that the probability of getting a seat on the desired 
flight is greater. But lower load factors, like other service amenities (such 
as speedy baggage claim, more elegant on-board accommodations. and more 
personal attention) can be achieved only at greater cost to the firm and thus to 
the consumer. From the individual consumer's viewpoint, the problem is 
basically one of "trading off" the (marginal) value of inc reased quality with 
the associated increase in cost. The important thing to consider is that 
service·quality does matter. 1 If the "wrong" quality of service is provided, 
then allocative efficiency does not obtain any more than efficiency obtains when 
prices are unequal to marginal costs. 
The (conceptual) determination of optimal service quality is illustrated in 
Figure 2. Quality is measured on the horizontal axis in units and on a scale 
I. The relevance of service quality can be seen with the model sketched out 
as follows. Individual i's utility is defined by UFUi(X, Q, W,), where X= 
quantity of output, Q=quality of output, W=work expended, and where 
aUi/~X>O, ~Ui/dQ>O, and ~ui/dW<O. The perfectly competitive supply 
total cost of output is defined as C=C(X,Q,), where ~c/ax>o and )C/~Q>O. 
Finally, total income (for spending on output) is the wage rate.!:. times work 
expended, W. The maximization problem then resolves into Max: 
Z=Ui(X, Q, W) - ,,[C(X. Q)-rW]. Not counting the budget constraint, the 
first-order conditions (second-order assumed to hold) conle down to: 
(mi/~x)/(ac/,}x) = (;)Ui/()Q)/(bC/~Q) = (lIUi/olW)/(-r). which means that 
the ratios of marginal utilities of output quantity, output quality, and work 
expended to their respective "costs" are equal. 
Cost, 
Value 
o 
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which is commensurate with equal outlays for successive quality increases. 
While higher quality, of course, is desirable, one presumes that after a point 
the (extra) value of increased quality becomes less and less. Thus, for quality 
less than Q', the individual in question values increased quality more than the 
commensurate increase in per-unit cost. Past Q', greater quality is still 
desirable, but of less value than the extra cost. Thus, allocative efficiency 
requires that the quality of service be at Q' and in addition the price of service 
be equal to marginal cost. 
III. Applications to Airline Pricing and Resource Allocation 
Having set out these general rules for efficient resource allocation, it is 
important to understand that their application to transportation industries, 
specifically the airlines, is no easy task. The pricing of airline service is 
complicated by a number of very important characteristics of air transport 
cost and demand. 
On the cost side there are indi visibilities in production, Not only do 
aircraft come in discrete units, but what is probably more important, their 
seat capacity is not subject to instantaneous change. Even if it were possible 
to select the "best" aircraft (in the sense of seating capacity) for a set of 
city-pair markets, because the re are variations in density of travel among 
such cities and because there are economies in reducing the numbe r of diffe rent 
aircraft types employed, one normally would expect that on some routes eithe,' 
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aircraft would fly with some empty seats and/or passengers would be left 
at the gate unless there were sufficient pricing flexibility to ration off excess 
demand and/or fill empty seats. Moreover, as Douglas has described. demand 
is not "certain," but stochastic. Because of this characteristic there will be 
additional instances of excess demand for seats on the one hand, and excess 
capacity (i. e., aircraft not fully loaded) on the other. 
Another characteristic of airline costs is that seat-mile costs for a given 
trip distance fall with larger aircraft size. This accounts for the propensity 
for users of air service to consolidate their demands. While some high-
salaried executives may indeed depart via a personal turbojet airc raft when 
and where they desire, the strong scale economies associated with aircraft 
size make it desirable for most travelers to aggregate their preferred departure 
points (and destinations) and their preferred.departure (and arrival) times to 
common ones. 
On the demand side, users of airline services place some value on the 
reliability and stability of rates and service. Since inforIllation is not perfect 
and costs of coordination are not negligible, the convention of scheduled service 
at assured fares has emerged. If the information and adjustment processes 
were without cost, then the efficient solution would require holding up departures 
until a full load of passengers could be generated (at a price conunensurate 
with 100 percent load factors). Or, as William Vickery has suggested, price 
could be varied instantaneously so as to fill the aircraft by the precise time 
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of departure. 1 Actually, neither schetne is optitnal sitnply because users 
of air service value certainty and wish to save on infortnation costs. 2 
A related characte ristic of detnand is that because of the etnerging 
convention of scheduled service, the presence of excess capacity is highly 
valued. (This was described by George Douglas in the previous presentation. ) 
If average load factors are 50 percent rather than 75 percent, then the proba-
bility of a user's being able to secure passage on the scheduled flight of his 
choice is higher. Also, for given aircraft capacities, a lower average load 
factor tneans a greater frequency of service and thus a higher probability that 
a flight is scheduled reasonably close to the user's tnost desired titne of 
departure. 
As noted before. however, excess capacity has its costs, since users 
tnust pay for it if total costs are to be covered. Thus, the relevant decision 
is not whether to have excess capacity, but rather how tnuch is optitnal. On 
an aggregate level this depends on users' perception of the tnarginal values 
and tnarginal costs of excess capacity. 
There are a nutnber of other econotnic efficiency questions having to do 
with excess capacity, an itnportant one being the argutnent for discritninatory 
discount fares. 3 Essentially, the proposition is as follows: given that the 
1. Williatn Vickery, "Responsive Pricing of Public Utility Services, " The 
Bell Journal of Econotnics and Managetnent Science (Spring 1971), pp. 341-2. 
2. Cotnpare the advantage of having readily-available infortnation on flight 
prices and departure titnes with a need to tnonitor constantly changing 
flight-titne and price alternatives. 
3. These include youth and tnilitary discounts, discounts for children, etc. 
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airlines have excess capacity, why not give a price break to new. previously 
untapped markets; if these consumers pay anything in excess of "marginal" 
costs (presumed to be very low), ,then existing passengers too stand to benefit 
since this means their fare can be lowered. This argument, while intuitively 
appealing, fails to recognize the essential role of excess capacity in the quality 
of service and further ignores relevant opportunity cost concepts. 
If excess capacity is one dimension of service quality. then the addition 
of reserved-seat discount passengers lowers service quality for "regular" 
passengers. In addition to the lower probability of obtaining a seat on the 
desired flight, there is the disadvantage of sharing flight attendants with more 
passengers, plus the extra crowding on-board and greater time taken in aircraft. 
ingress and egress. 
More relevant, however, is the fact that the real (i. e., opportunity) cost 
of adding a discount passenger is the value of the service to the (marginal) 
potential regular passenger who does not fly because the discount is not made 
available generally. And because the real cost of the extra service to the 
(marginal) discount pas senge r exceeds the fare he pays. the re are allocati ve 
efficiency losses. 
The re are two relevant modifications to this analysis that should be 
mentioned. both having to do with the total volume of traffic under the two 
pricing schemes. If under discriminatory discount fares the total volume of 
traffic at any point in time is greater than with a non-discriminatory. lower 
price (or alternatively lowering the regular price won't Ifi11" existing aircraft 
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as effectively as employing discriminatory fares), then this is simply an 
indication that total airline capacity is excessive. On the other hand, as 
George Douglas has shown, in very small markets the increase in service 
quality (via greater frequency, lower seat costs of larger aircraft, etc.) 
arising out of increased total traffic volume with discounts (as opposed to 
lower normal fares) provides some justification for discount fares, at least 
in those markets. However, the optimal fare differential under such circum-
stances is likely to be very small. 1 
Excess capacity is also related to seating density, another obvious 
quality parameter. For a given flight, the greater the seating density the 
greater is quality in terms of seat availability, but the less is seating com-
fort. Of course, passengers differ in their preferences, but it would appear 
likely that after some point the typical user would prefer to convert some 
excess capacity (in the form of extra seats) into less dense seating. More-
over, since for a given rate of travel between city pairs the cost of excess 
capacity is greater for long-haul flights than for short-haul, one would expect 
optimal load factors and seating densities to be higher for long-distance travel. 
Finally, since for a given length of haul the marginal value of excess capacity 
(in terms of reducing delay time) is greater for lower density markets, one 
would expect optirnalload factors and seating densities to be higher the greater 
the total volume of traffic. 2 
1. George W. Douglas. "Price Discrimination and Scale Economies in 
Scheduled Air Transportation" (Chapel Hill: processed, 1971). 
2. Also, see George Douglas I presentation. 
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The institutions surrounding commercial aviation raise several more 
interesting types of efficiency problems. For example, since under current 
arrangements the non-fulfillment of a reservation is costless, for a typical 
flight more reservations are made than passengers show up. This, in turn, 
leads carriers to "ove rbook" flights, relying on "no- shows" to yield enough 
extra seats. Occasionally, however, the number of showing reserved-seat 
passengers exceeds the flight's capacity. The U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB) now fines airlines for this practice, but obviously, given the institution 
of free reservations, some overbooking is optimal. In fact, the optimal fine 
is one which causes airlines to overbook just to the point that the number of 
additional reserved passengers left at the gate just offsets the number of 
extra passengers who could have been accommodated in seats made available 
by no-show reservation passengers. 
The subject of airline safety is much too broad to receive adequate 
attention here. However, it is important to note that safety has. its. "costs. " 
Its benefit, of course, is a reduced probability of a serious or perhaps fatal 
accident. Depending on one's valuation of human life and s uffe ring, the optimal 
expenditure on safety is where the expected value reduction in accident "costs" 
just equals the marginal cost of this (inc reased) safety provision. I 
Another type of allocation problem arises in connection with the efficient 
pricing of diffe rent outputs on the same airc raft flight. As between fi rs t- class 
1. For an interesting discussion see Thomas C. Shelling. "The Life You Save 
May Be Your Own, " in Samuel B. Chase, Jr .• (ed.), Problems in Public 
Expenditure Analysis (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968). 
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and coach service, it is important to recognize that the opportunity cost of 
first-class space is the eliminated coach space; and vice-versa. I In effect, 
except for the extremely short run, first-class and coach space are common 
costs (i. e., their proportions may be easily varied by moving the bulkhead 
and changing ?~ few seats). Keeping in mind that first-class passengers 
receive extra se rvice amenities in the form of more personalized stewardess 
services (fewer passengers per stewardess), more expensive meals, etc., 
that they exit the aircraft before coach class (and thus considering opportunity 
cost their cost is higher), that the space between ~ of seats is greater 
than in coach class, and that load factors in first class are usually lower than 
in coach, a good rule of thumb is that first-class accommodations should be 
priced at least 50 percent higher than coach, since f.irst class has four seats 
abreast whereas coach class typically has six. 2 
The optimal relationship between passenger and cargo prices is more 
difficult to determine. The problem is that while the ratio of passenger vs. 
cargo space on a "combination" aircraft is variable at the aircraft manufacturing 
1. Aircraft are much more commonly space-constrained as opposed to weight-
constrained. Thus, space is the relevant scarce resource, although ob-
viously weight constrained cases are important. 
2. It is worth noting that in many cases what a first-class passenger buys is 
not so much more luxurious accommodations but simply a confirmed space. 
That is, since load factors average much lower in first class, peak-hour 
accommodations are typically rationed by the first-class fare. Also, 
obviously people pay extra fo r the ability to obtain a reservation "at the 
last minute." Both roles for first class could be handled more efficiently 
by peak-load-pricing and perhaps by reserving a block of standard seats 
for last-minute sales (at a higher price). 
~30 
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stage, once an aircraft has been produced it is most difficult to reallocate 
space. I Thus, in the long run, cargo and passenger space are common 
products; in the strict short run they are joint products. As a forthcoming 
paper by the author suggests, an appropriate pricing rule is to charge "belly 
freight, " a price equal to the cost of carrying such freight (at comparable 
service quality) in all-freight aircraft. Z 
IV. The Relevance of Industry Behavior 
Many pricing problems in the airlines must be considered within the 
context of industry behavior. By "industry behavior, " we mean the response 
pattern that describes industry "competition." Briefly, as DeVany, Douglas, 
Eads, Jordan, Yance, and I have argued, the domestic airline industry can 
be characterized as a non-price competing cartel. 3 Prices are given, being 
regulated by the CAB. Carriers then "compete" (or rival) in non-price (i. e. , 
quality) dimensions, primarily the extent of excess capacity. Our operational 
1. Almost all commonly used pas senge r aircraft have cargo space in excess 
of that required for passenger baggage. 
Z. See "Cargo Pricing and the Configuration of Combination Aircraft, " Journal 
of Transport Economics and Policy (forthcoming). 
3. See Arthur DeVany, "The Economics of Quality Competition: Theory and 
Evidence on Airline Flight Scheduling," unpublished (c. 1969); George W. 
Douglas, CAB Docket 21866-9, DOT-T-3 (May 17, 1971); George Eads, 
"Competition in the Domestic Trunk Airline Industry: Excessive or Insuf-
ficient?" (Washington: The Brookings Institution, forthcoming); William A. 
Jordan, Airline Regulation in America: Effects and Imperfections (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); Joseph V. Yance, CAB Docket 21866-6, DOT-
RT-l (July 27, 1970); and James C. Miller III, CAB Docket 21866-6, DOT-
T-l (July 6, 1970). 
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hypothesis is that over time schedule frequency will adjust in individual 
(competitive) markets so that actual load factors approximate break-even 
(including a normal return on investment). I 
To see that carriers have incentives which caUSe them to move in the 
direction of break-even load factors, consider first a situation where pre-
vailing load factors are above break-even. In this disequilibrium situation, 
carriers will expand scheduling in hopes of making profits on extra flights. 
Load factors will fall. If on the other hand prevailing load factors are below 
break-even, carriers will be prompted to cut back on scheduling as a means 
of r·educing losses. Load factors will rise. 2 
We may illustrate the importance of policy-makers' understanding 
industry behavior with three examples. 
Cross-Subsidy by Length of Haul 
For many years the CAB has fostered a policy of "cross-subsidizing" 
long-haul and short-haul markets. Essentially the argument is that fares 
1. Recently the CAB has recognized the applicability of this model to airline 
regulation, stating, 
"It is indisputable that eve ry fare level has a built-in load factor 
standard. We find, as DOT has stated, that the higher the fare 
level in relation to cost, the more capacity carriers will offer 
and the lower load factors will be; and. conversely, the lower 
the fare Ie vel, the les s capacity car riers will ope rate and the 
higher load factors will be." (CAB Order 71-4-54, <\pril 9, 1972. 
p. 23.) 
2. This argument is often missed (and perhaps purposely obfuscated) by 
those placing especial emphasis on market share relationships. Douglas 
and I deal with this in our Brookings study (£E.. cit.). 
23 
cannot be raised to the level of average cost in short-haul markets since 
there would be "undue diversion" to alternative, competitive modes. Fares 
in long-hauls, however, should exceed costs. the long-haul profits thereby 
used to (cross-) subsidize losing short-haul business. The basic price-cost 
relationship by length of haul is illustrated (conceptually) in Figure 3. 
"While this may work in theory, it doesn't work in practice." What happens 
is that because break-even load factors are high in short-haul markets. actual 
load factors also tend to be high. Because break-even load factors are low in 
long-haul markets •. actual load factors also tend to be low. This is seen in 
Table 1. (N. B., load factors for very short-haul markets include many local 
service subsidized routes where because of the subsidy. break-even load 
factor is lower than otherwise.) Note particularly the monotonic decline in 
load factors past 500 miles. 
In short, cross-subsidy is largely a fiction and it will continue to be as 
long as carriers are free to adjust capacity in response to prices and costs. 
Pricing Strategies to Control Pollution 
With increasing public concern over the "environmental impact" of 
economic activities, commercial airports have been singled out (somewhat 
unfairly) as a primary source of air and noise pollution. Much is being done 
by way of "retrofitting" old jet engines and redesign of new ones. However, 
this may be viewed as a longer- range solution and even under technology likely 
to materialize could not be expected to eliminate aircraft pollution entirely. 
Fare, 
Cost 
per 
Mile 
o 
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Figure 3 
Average Fare 
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(@ constant 
load factor) 
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Table I: 1969 Coach Load Factors by Length of Haul 
Miles Load Factor Miles Load Factor 
100 50.7 1,300 53.B 
200 53. 1 1,600 52.5 
300 53.6 1,900 52.2 
400 54.6 2,200 49.9 
500 55.6 2,500 46.0 
700 55.4 2,BOO 45.9 
1,000 54.B Average 50.0 
Source: CAB Docket 21B66-9, BC-4BOB. 
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Economists have often suggested using the price mechanism to 
"internalize" pollution costs and thus, ceteris paribus, bringing about 
a more efficient level of pollution output. We shall assume that pollution 
is a monotonic, increasing function of the number and size of aircraft 
making take-oHs and landings, and thus, as a proxy, the narrow policy 
objective is to decrease the number of seats scheduled by commercial 
operators. 
The industry behavioral model described in the previous section may 
be sketched out as follows. Quantity of air service demanded (~ante and 
supplied ~~) is a function of both price and the number of seats scheduled: 
D = D(P,X). Average and marginal costs are of two kinds: first, those 
associated with passengers (Cd), and second, those related to seats (Cx )' 1 
Assuming constant returns to scale in both categories, the total cost function 
is given by C = CdD + CxX. Finally, 
where1T' is profit, and any excess profit (or loss) "slack" is taken up by 
variations in X. 
As discussed below, the important policy variables are P, Cd- and Cx' 
We wish to know their individual effects on X. Equation (10) may be differentiated 
to yield, 
(11 ) 
1. This corresponds generally to the conventional distinction between "direct" 
and flindirect" airline costs. 
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(12 ) 
dX 
= 
-D and 
Cx-@D/.}XXP-Cd) 
, 
dCd 
dX 
= 
-x 
dCx Cx-@D/OX~P-Cd)' (13 ) 
where ed is the price elasticity of demand. Also, we note that, 
( 14) 
(15 ) 
dX = D[l+ed(l-CdlP)]dP-DdCd, and 
Cx -0D/oX)(P- Cd) 
Equation (15) simply states a necessary condition for market equilibrium, 
namely that as carriers put on additional capacity, load factors fall (i. e. , 
"marginal load factor" is less than average load factor). (Otherwise scheduling 
would increase without limit. ) 
Public policy to restrain aircraft pollution through market incentives may 
be initiated by two groups. First, the GAB may effectuate a change in the level 
of fares. For example, one presumes that a fare increase would have a depress-
ing effect on aircraft pollution. (But read on!) Second, the local-government 
airport authority may impose some form of "user charges" to curtail total 
pollution output. 1 Let us consider the following alternatives: (1) a fare increase 
imposed by the CAB, (b) an increase in landing fees imposed by local authorities, 
(c) a "head tax" paid by passengers, (d) a head tax paid by the air carriers, and 
1. Most major commercial airports are owned and operated by local govern-
ments. The exceptions include the two Washington, D. C., airports, 
National and Dulles, owned and operated by the Federal Government. (It 
has been proposed that these be sold to the highest bidder.) Some airports 
are privately owned and operated, the largest being Burbank, California. 
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(e) a head tax paid by the carriers where the CAB allows them to pass along 
the cost increase in the form of higher fares. 1 
From equation (11) we may determine that an increase in the price of 
air service will actually increase X if ed > -1. The denominator of the 
right-hand side of (11) [and also of (12), (13), and (14)] is positive by reference 
to (10) and (15). The numerator is negative only when demand is sufficiently 
elastic that ed(l - Cd/P) < -1. 2 This is an important result, inasmuch as the 
CAB, at least, judges air travel demand to be inelastic. 3 If true, then a 
corollary of the above result is that the Board could bring about a reduction 
in pollution by lowering fares. 
An increase in landing fees would be tantamount to an increase in Cx • 4 
From equation (13) we see that the effect would be a reduction in X since the 
right-hand side is negative. 
A head tax on passengers would be similar to an increase in fares, but 
the difference is decisive. Whether demand is elastic or inelastic, carriers' 
total revenue would be reduced (io e. , quantity demanded would fall because 
of the perceived higher price), and thus scheduling would have to contract. 5 
1. Of course, there are other alternatives (e.g., flight quotas, price dis-
c rimination, etc.), but these are not conside red here. 
2. Roughly this would require that ed < -2, since in practice Cd/p .... 5. 
3. The CAB has found demand elasticity to be -.7 (CAB Order 71-4-59, 
71-4-60, April 9, 1971, p. 50.). While many researchers disagree with 
this as sessment, few would maintain that Cd < -2. 
4. Landing fees are typically in proportion to the gross weight of the aircraft. 
5. The application of a head tax would mean an unambiguous dec rease in D. 
Referring to equation (10), since Cd< P and C
x 
is unchanged, X must 
decrease. 
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If the carriers pay the head tax, this would mean an increase in Cd' 
Since the right-hand side of equation (12) is negative, the result would be 
a diminution of X and thus a decrease in pollution. 
Finally, a head tax paid by the carriers which is passed along in the 
form of higher fares would likewise have a depressing effect on X. Note 
that in this case dP = dCd in equation (14) Since ed< 0, the numerator 
is always negative. 
Thus, in one case what would seem like a straightforward policy action 
to control pollution (i. e., higher fares to choke off demand) would be likely 
to have the reverse result, owing to the industry behavior pattern that has 
developed under Federal regulation. 
Pricing and the Demand for Aircraft 
A related issue is the effect of airline pricing on the derived demand for 
aircraft. In other words, how would changes in fare levels (everything else 
equal) affect airlines' requirements for new aircraft? 
First, it is notable that many economists and others have recommended 
that the airlines be "deregulated." Based on the available experience with a 
deregulated airline environment (e. g., the California intra-state market l ), 
the presumption is that fares would fall substantially. Carriers generally 
oppose fare reductions, but with increasing pressure from charte rs and the 
imposition of the Board's higher load factor standards, prospects for signi-
ficant fare reductions must be seriously considered. 
1. On this see Jordan, ibid. 
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Anyway, the nOrrrlal reaction to the fare-aircraft demand issue goes 
something like this: lower fares would mean greater travel and thus a 
greater demand for aircraft. However, it should be recognized that lower 
fares mean an increase in break-even load factor. The question is whether 
the rise in break-even load factor is more or less than sufficient to offset 
the increase in passenger demand. 
The answer is given by equation (it), and this result comes as something 
of a surprise. That is, a decrease in fares (ceteris paribus) would likely 
curtail airlines' requirements for new aircraft. Given this result, I would 
expect Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas, Lockheed and even NASA to be ardent 
supporters of CAB regulation! 
